Victor Kevliuk, an expert at the Center for Defense Strategies, was among thirty participants in a specialized program for senior officers implemented by the MIM-Kyiv in collaboration with the Come Back Alive Foundation in 2019. With 34 years of service, including leadership at the Center for Civil-Military Cooperation of the Joint Operational Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, he now works for an international company specializing in manufacturing air and surface unmanned systems.

A recent discourse on social media sparked conversations regarding the trust Ukrainians place in military experts. Dmytro Lykhoviy, editor-in-chief of Novynarnya, a website dedicated to military topics, compiled a roster of analysts deserving attention. Among them, Viktor Kevliuk's opinions were cited as credible. Notably, the list also encompassed Taras Chmut, the head of the "Come Back Alive" foundation.

Thus, we talked to Viktor Kevliuk to delve into matters concerning handling combat-related materials, the adversary's objectives in the information sphere, and the impact of information and psychological operations (PSYOP) on public sentiment.

On Studies at the MIM-Kyiv

Reflecting on Studies at the MIM I found the Business School's approach to education greatly appealing. In contrast to my military education at the Strategy Department of the National Defense University, which primarily involved rote memorization of departmental texts, the Business School instilled the understanding that strategy development is a creative process. A variety of perspectives and methodologies exist. Alongside crafting strategies, there's a need to address staff motivation, implement strategic changes, and engage with opponents. My time at MIM yielded valuable insights, particularly as I ventured into opportunities with foreign companies. Interestingly, my diplomas from the National Defense University of Ukraine held little sway, but my business school diploma proved pivotal for acquiring work permits, residency, and resolving logistical matters when I was settling abroad. I still retain notes from my time at MIM.

On Civil-Military Co-operation

Regrettably, my assessment of CIMIC during the "Great War" is disheartening. From my standpoint, civil-military cooperation, a pivotal aspect of military-administrative endeavors, appears to be languishing. It seems that tasks unrelated to this collaboration have taken precedence. Unfortunately, a mindset has taken root among commanders that envisions warfare in isolation, detached from civilian elements. This leads to tasks beyond the purview of CIMIC, such as searching for and evacuating deceased personnel, a role reserved for rear support and logistics. While CIMIC personnel are well-intentioned, there's a lack of clarity on execution methods. Even now, chiefs of staff remain uncertain about how to integrate CIMIC effectively.

An illustrative instance underlines the importance of CIMIC: During a peacekeeping operation by African Union forces in a certain nation, tensions escalated, leading to guerrilla warfare, terrorist attacks, and civil unrest due to their alienation of the local populace. To rectify this, the African Union sought assistance from the United Kingdom, dispatching a high-ranking civil-military cooperation expert. His expertise, for which Africa paid a substantial sum, was employed to teach African military personnel how to foster relations with civilians.

Initially, our approach held promise. Led by Colonel Alexei Nozdrachev, a distinguished alumnus of the United States Army War College, we maintained connections with numerous international organizations engaged in humanitarian efforts, demining, and human rights advocacy, as well as Ukrainian volunteer groups. Our focus aligned with the essence of CIMIC – understanding the civilian context and assembling databases to assist in commanders' decisions. However, the current trajectory remains uncertain, and I'm unable to provide a clear explanation for this shift.

The Army as a Reflection of Ukrainian Society

Much like any other military force, our army mirrors the society it stems from. A strong belief often rests in the power of written records. In a business context, I was involved in forging a $3 million deal solely through a phone call, devoid of a single paper document. There's no extensive documentation apart from fulfilled commitments. The essence lies in mutual trust, holding only the necessary documents for fund transfers through banks.

In the context of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, numerous subtleties have traversed from the Soviet military. Take the military council, for instance. It appears Napoleon aptly stated that those unafraid of decision-making engage in battle, while the hesitant convene a military council. Colossal decisions, obscured by collective choices, define our actions despite a designated commander. This individual bears responsibility, and under their leadership, each participant fulfills their role.

This scenario resonates throughout the Armed Forces at all echelons, and the excessive paper bureaucracy constricts those steering management processes. As a result, individuals often seek alternatives. They opt to circumvent reliance on state resources, instead seeking aid from volunteers, making personal contributions, or even purchasing necessities themselves to evade excessive reports for their losses in combat.

On Objectives of Information Warfare

Three core objectives underscore information warfare:

The foremost goal entails creating distrust within the enemy state's military and political leadership. Recall the information landscape from 2014 to 2019, where foreign narratives imposed themselves, telling tales about encirclement and unmitigated failures. However, a rigorous military analysis unveiled a wholly different reality.

The second objective revolves around demoralizing the enemy's armed forces. From text messages to orchestrated groups on telegram channels, individuals posing as family members of military personnel disseminate specific viewpoints to undermine morale.

Illustratively, in 2010, the Armed Forces of Ukraine's information warfare unit conducted a training exercise of this nature. An announcement was posted in a military town suggesting the closure of a kindergarten due to budget constraints. Early the next morning, family members gathered at the unit's checkpoint, demanding clarification. The issue reached the commander of ground forces, General Vorobyov, who was perplexed. Upon inquiry, it emerged that the general himself had approved the exercise. A small announcement bore potentially significant repercussions.

The third goal involves eroding the population's morale. This encompasses promoting panic-driven narratives, confusion, fostering disbelief in victory, and magnifying real and perceived challenges.

On Sources of Information and Trustworthiness

When assessing sources of information or evaluating content, it's imperative to emphasize transparency. Anonymous sources should be avoided. Instead, scrutinize the source. Who are the authors? Are they recent entrants to the information arena or reputable institutions with decades of operation, such as CNN? Based on this, delve deeper into the topic while gauging its alignment with reality. If someone is propagating fanciful notions like the advent of Death Stars and alien alliances, it's advisable to disengage from such sources.

Professionals with recognized expertise, formal training, or affiliations with reputable analytical bodies are worth of attention. The conclusions drawn might not always align with one's beliefs, yet such inputs can offer valuable guidance.

On Information and Psychological Operations (IPSYOP) and Their Relation to Ilovaisk

Information and psychological operations entail intricate strategies and subtle instruments. Proficiency in execution isn't universal. When adversaries propagate narratives, such as impending harsh winters, it could serve as either a preparatory stage for a psychological operation or an immediate means of intimidation. Well-crafted PSYOP, orchestrated by skilled practitioners, can subtly influence minds without the subject's awareness.

Consider the case of Ilovaisk. Nearly a decade later, the prevailing notion portrays it as a significant defeat for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Curiously, Ukrainian forces were not even present in the Ilovaisk region. Those caught in the crossfire were merely retreating between points A and B, intersecting with Ilovaisk en route. Extensive analysis of anti-terrorist operations yielded no evidence of combat engagement. Nevertheless, the narrative of the "cauldron" and defeat persists, as does the perception of abandonment by command. Even the heroic actions of Colonel Pyvovarenko, who fought valiantly until his demise, are shrouded in misinformation, labeling him a prisoner of war or implying cooperation with the Russian command.

Another instance is the portrayal of Debaltseve as a resounding victory for Russian arms. In reality, it represented an attempt to encircle and eliminate a brigade, which not only managed to escape but also counterattacked vigorously. While serving at the headquarters of the West Operational Command during this period, I observed the 128th Brigade's situation. Amid speculation of heavy casualties, only 60 out of 1200 soldiers were lost. Can this be termed defeat? Yet, we're constantly subjected to negative narratives, perpetuating despair. Breaking out of encirclement is as much a tactical action as offense or defense. This enabled the brigade's survival and subsequent resurgence. The brigade currently participates near Zaporizhzhia, revitalized and reinforced. It achieved victory in Debaltseve, not the Russians.

In conclusion, the those who first disseminating its agenda can transform victory into defeat and vice versa. Information's potency lies in its ability to shape perceptions and realities.